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Abstract: This article presents the main distinctive characteristics of the Nordic welfare states. These 
include, for example, full employment, high degree of equality, a high level of taxes and a high level of 
public spending on welfare. The article further presents data, which enables the reader to a comparison 
with welfare states in Europe and to analyse whether we are witnessing convergence in Europe and/or 
the withering away of the Nordic Model. The conclusion being that the Nordic Model is here to stay, 
although a movement in a European direction is underway. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
  Describing what characterise the Nordic welfare 
state model is the core aim of this article. Furthermore, 
the article will analyse whether the model will continue 
to be different from other welfare state types. The 
Nordic welfare states have been, as other welfare states, 
under pressure from Europeanisation and globalization. 
These challenges for regional defined, historical 
developed and managed welfare states could be a 
reason for converging trends in welfare states. 
Furthermore, this could be a reason for the development 
of a more uniform and common European type of 
welfare states. This due to that it is to be expected, that 
a common European model would be under less 
pressure within the European Union and the Economic 
and Monetary Union as this could adapt to the 
economic possibilities. Pressure for change may apply 
in particular in the case of welfare states models with 
high emphasis on state financing, such as the Nordic 
welfare state model. A clear focus of this article is a 
depiction of the specific characteristics of the Nordic 
welfare state, but done in a comparative perspective and 
at the same time questioning and discussing 
convergence in a European perspective. The article uses 
the comparative methodology as this and models make 
it possible to have a mirror with which to compare the 
Nordic model. 
  The pressure, it has been argued, would make it 
impossible to maintain a specific national welfare state 
with a high degree of emphasis on full employment and 
equality, but it also seems that ”despite undeniable 
problems posed by economic internationalisation, social 
democratic welfare states and employment regimes 
have proven to be highly resilient”
[1]. Economic 
internationalisation can be both impact from 
Europeanisation and Globalisation. 
  High levels of taxes and high wages do thus not 
necessarily make welfare regimes with high levels of 
public intervention uncompetitive with other welfare 
states, despite the reduction in effectiveness of the 
traditional Keynesian economic policies. One reason 
could be differences between the compositions of the 
export sectors in the different regimes; another could be 
a higher emphasis on human-capital formation and high 
labour-force participation in regimes with high levels of 
public intervention. This does not affect by itself the 
issue of how to steer and manage the economy in 
different welfare states. This is due to that the increased 
economic integration between economies and 
internationalisation has changed the traditional ability 
to maintain overall economic policy-making. Thereby 
has, at least for small countries, the option of using 
traditional economic steering mechanisms been 
reduced. 
  The emphasis in this article is thus on whether, on 
the basis of ongoing Europeanisation and globalization 
and its possible impact on the continuation of a national 
welfare state, one might be able to identify any specific 
traits in the development of the Nordic welfare states. 
  The article is divided in several subsections. 
Firstly, the article will discuss briefly the concepts of 
the welfare state. Secondly, the article will by way of 
comparative data try to depict whether certain 
characteristics are still at hand when looking at the 
Nordic welfare states. Finally, the article will discuss 
the tendency, towards convergence of social policies in 
a European perspective, as convergence could be a 
reason for the withering away of a specific Nordic 
welfare state. J. Social Sci., 3 (2): 43-51, 2007 
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  A core thesis to be explored is that Europeanisation 
and globalisation is not a threat to the development and 
maintenance of universal Nordic welfare states, but that 
we are witnessing convergent trends, which might be 
influenced by these factors. This article will thus also 
question the conclusions of among others Pierson
[2] and 
Scharpf and Schmidt
[3] - who, for example, conclude: 
“that there is no convergence in the welfare state”.  
  Methodologically, the overall argument on 
convergence will mainly be pursued via a combination 
of analysis of concepts and theoretical arguments on 
welfare state development coupled with empirical 
support from international comparative economic and 
social data. 
  
What is a welfare state – and what is the Nordic 
welfare state model: A core issue in the discussion of 
the welfare state is how to define it, how to define its 
boundaries and the connections between the welfare 
state and other aspects of societal development. 
Historically, the term was introduced in the 1930's. Yet, 
a single, commonly agreed definition still does not 
exist
[4]. This despite, that already Titmuss in 1962 said: 
“The term has apparently come to mean all sorts of 
thing”
[5]. It seems, though, that in many ways the debate 
surrounding the welfare state revolves around the 
interaction between state, market and civil society. 
Furthermore, the debate includes how the state deals 
with essentially democratic decisions on issues such as 
economic prosperity, employment, housing, health, 
social security and education and whether the state does 
this in such a way that at least some minimum standards 
are achieved. 
  The core of the Scandinavian or Nordic model, for 
a long time, has been argued to be “to improve the 
ability of society to master its problems and to enrich 
and equalize the living conditions of individuals and 
families. In social policy, the cornerstone of the model 
is  universalism”
[6]. For a further debate on 
universalism, cf. Kristensen this volume. 
  Universalism has thus been argued as a central 
aspect of the Nordic countries and “universal welfare 
policies are often contrasted with selective policies of a 
residual, means-testing kind, targeted at the poor”
[7].  
An argument for the universal welfare states in the 
Nordic countries has in fact been that universal 
programmes are better and less stigmatizing than 
means-tested benefits and further that they could be a 
way to ensure consensus and support from the middle-
class. Universalism has thus been a point of departure 
also making it possible for the agrarian and labour 
movement in agreement to develop the societies
[8], 
  Already Titmuss in 1968 pointed to that 
“Universalism is not, by itself alone, enough: in 
medical care, in wage related social security and in 
education. This much we have learnt in the past two 
decade from the facts about inequalities in the 
distribution of incomes and wealth”
[9]. 
  Still, the difference in balance between the various 
elements, which can be part of the scope and task for a 
welfare state, might even explain why many countries 
label themselves welfare states, even though with a 
very different approach to delivery and financing of the 
activities. Moreover, this might also be a reason why it 
has been possible, within the European Union to 
discuss and talk about a European Social Model: 
because the expression can be interpreted with different 
meanings and connotations.  
  Whatever has been labelled a welfare state it has 
been under pressure over the last 20-25 years. Pressures 
on the welfare state have been grouped under the 
following three headings: 
*  Difficulties in financing due to globalisation and 
changed technology 
*  A changed context of welfare policy-making, 
including the growing importance of the EU-level 
*  Change in the overall level of demand for welfare, 
due to demography, family patterns and the labour 
market
[10]. 
   Especially the first heading (financing) has it been 
argued have an impact on the Nordic welfare states 
development. The argument being that developments in 
the free movement of capital and labour imply that the 
possibilities for national variations in financing have 
been reduced. This implies that high-level spending 
welfare states needing state financing of welfare have 
more difficulties now and in the future to find the 
necessary means to achieve the goals of the welfare 
states.  
  The two other types of pressures do also have an 
impact, especially if linked to the argument on 
financing. Change at the supranational level (EU) and 
change in demography have in various ways an impact 
on the level and the manner in which also the Nordic 
welfare states are structured. Demography does so 
because of the need for expenditure to fulfil the 
minimum needs arising from more elderly who need 
health care, pensions and other types of care, while 
there are fewer on the labour market.  
  The ageing of societies had or might in the future 
have an impact, creating a pressure on the welfare state 
due to the changed demographic composition also in 
the Nordic countries. On the EU (EU-15) level, it is 
expected that up to the year 2050 demographic changes 
imply the following increases in central areas of public 
sector spending (figures are percentages of GDP): J. Social Sci., 3 (2): 43-51, 2007 
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Public pension expenditure  3.2  
Health  Care    1.3-1.7 
Long-term  Care    0.9-1.0 
 
  There are huge variations between the member 
states, but in any case, these figures indicate not 
necessarily budgetary challenges, but rather a conflict 
and a distributional issue to be solved in most welfare 
states
[11]. This naturally could imply a debate on the 
balance between different sectors in society and if the 
economic room for manoeuvre is small, then changes 
will be difficult. The degree of pressure on public sector 
spending depends to a high degree on the success of the 
labour-market policies and the ability to increase the 
participation rate and the average age of retirement 
from the labour market. If the presently expected 
increases in participation rate and age of retirement are 
successfully achieved, then the pressure on public 
sector spending will be less. All the same, transitional 
problems will arise, as will a need to transfer economic 
resources from one area of public spending to another. 
Arguments of the consequences of demographic 
transitions can be used as a starting point for changes in 
the universal Nordic welfare states. 
  In the welfare state literature different key words 
have been attached to the Nordic model when analysing 
welfare regimes. In an overview of typologies of 
regimes, the following has been presented
[12]: 
 
Esping-Andersen (1990) social-democratic: High 
level of decommodification; universal benefits and high 
degree of benefit equality 
 
Leibfried (1992) Scandinavian (modern): Right to 
work for everyone; universalism, welfare state as 
employer of first resort and compensator of last resort 
 
Castles and Mitchell (1993) non-right hegemony: 
High social expenditure and use of highly equalising 
instruments in social policy 
 
Siaroff (1994) protestant social-democratic: True 
work-welfare choice for women; high level of family 
benefits and always paid to the mother; importance of 
Protestantism 
 
Ferrera (1996) Scandinavian: social protection as 
citizenship right; universal coverage; relatively 
generous fixed benefits for various social risks; 
financing mainly through fiscal revenues; strong 
organizational integration 
 
Bonoli (1997) Nordic: Low percentage of social 
expenditure financed through contributions 
(Beveridge); high social expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP 
 
Korpi and Palme (1998) encompassing: Entitlement 
based on citizenship and labour force participation; use 
of flat-rate and earnings related benefit principle 
  With a few exceptions, the Nordic countries are 
placed in the above groups. Finland is an exception in 
Esping-Andersen where it is placed in the Conservative 
group. Denmark is an exception in Korpi and Palme 
where it is placed in the basic security model. 
 Greve
[13] focus on that in the Nordic welfare state, 
in what he has labelled the Scandinavian, 
Socialdemocratic, Keynesian model, the state is the 
main responsible for organising and financing the 
welfare state. 
  If we were to describe, based upon the above 
typologies what broadly could be accepted, as 
distinctive to the Nordic model it would be the 
following features: 
 Extremely  decentralised  and at the same time 
complex structure regarding both regulations as well as 
financing; High degree of equality; Active labour 
market policy with high level of employment (also for 
women) and low level of wage differentiation; High 
level of taxes; Family friendly in the sense that the 
public sector has been actively involved in delivery of 
day care for children, leaves schemes for parents and a 
high level compared to other welfare states of economic 
support for families with children. 
  The Nordic welfare states have further also been 
described as service welfare states. This especially due 
to service delivery with regard to delivery of social care 
(children and elderly) and health care service by the 
public sector. Especially family policy has been high on 
the agenda in the Nordic countries
[14]. Finally, the 
consensual approach on how to develop social policy in 
the Nordic countries can be mentioned. 
 These  distinctive  characteristics of the Nordic 
model are used when choosing data for the analysis. 
Whether these features still prevail will be analysed by 
looking at data for specific core elements such as 
employment/unemployment, degree of equality, 
poverty and social exclusion, spending on welfare, and 
how rich the Nordic countries are in comparison with 
other EU-countries.  
 
Delivery as a central issue in the Nordic welfare 
states:  Arguments for public sector intervention, for 
example due to market failure (which has been the 
historical reason for intervention) do not per se give any 
indication of which type of intervention is needed. J. Social Sci., 3 (2): 43-51, 2007 
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What can be agreed upon to be the best instrument to 
use in intervention will vary, depending on specific 
national and historical developments and on the more 
specific goals, the welfare state wants to achieve by the 
intervention. Reasons for intervention still exist and 
even with the development of more global needs for 
sufficient information, the reduction of other risks and 
uncertainty without doubt remain an issue for a welfare 
state
[15]. 
  However, intervention can and does take different 
forms in different welfare states and approaches have 
changed in most countries over the last 15-20 years. It 
is possible to distinguish between several forms of 
intervention: ranging from very direct intervention in 
the allocation of resources, to indirect corrections, for 
example, through the use of the legal system. The 
boundaries between the state, the market and civil 
society can thus be changed through various channels 
of intervention. In its most direct form, intervention 
transfers delivery from the private sector or takes it 
over from civil society. In the Nordic universal welfare 
states, financing and delivery are often by the state, 
including in the area of services. This in contrast to the 
more liberal types of welfare state using market 
delivery to a higher degree - although there will also be 
state economic support to ensure a decent living 
standard for the most vulnerable.  
  Table 1 accordingly shows the types of the 
interventions one could expect to find in a Nordic type 
of welfare states. The emphasis is on the consequences 
of intervention. In the Nordic welfare states, the main 
type of delivery used has been the direct approach, 
although recent years have seen tendencies towards the 
use of other approaches including more market and use 
of private elements in the delivery of welfare
[16]. 
  Different kinds of intervention can also be found in 
Barr
[17], who distinguishes between types of allocation 
and how they are related to production, regulation and 
financing. Barr’s account then indicates all the varieties 
from what is labelled “pure public” too “pure private”. 
Such an account also clearly indicates the possibility of 
moving gradually from public sector provision 
(financing and decisions on consumption made for the 
individual as in the traditional areas of the state: 
defence, police, administration etc.) to the fully market-
based areas of traditional goods, such as, food 
consumption.  
  Instead of pursuing the aims and consequences of 
intervention, a distinction can be made between 
provisions and financing, as is shown in Table 2 
(inspired by
[18]).  Here the discussion revolves more 
around how different kinds and combinations of 
production/financing    and   provision   can be 
achieved.  
  Table indicates that financing and provision can be, 
but do not need to be, linked to each other. Yet, this 
distinction, at least implicitly, build upon Titmuss 
division between public, fiscal and occupational 
welfare.  At the same time, this Table implies a role for 
the various elements in the welfare state triangle, i.e. 
between state, market and civil society. Finally, the 
Table indicates a very broad variety of possible ways of 
delivery of welfare state services. No normative 
presuppositions are implied in the Table, as no 
consequences for equity are attached to it. The Nordic 
countries have often both financing and delivery inside 
the public sector, e.g. placed in the upper left corner of 
the Table. 
  A reduction of the state’s impact and influence on 
social policy also being witnessed in the universal 
Nordic welfare states, implies that a new avenue is 
opening up for the developments. There is therefore a 
need for steering mechanisms, which can ensure that, 
on the one hand, the benefits of more open economies 
are guaranteed and on the other hand, these benefits are 
distributed to all members of a society. This can happen 
either in a context of corporate social responsibility or 
by having at least a minimum income protection 
available in a society. 
   It is useful, as indicated by the two Tables, to be 
aware of the fact that reasons for public sector 
intervention with the aim of improving society’s 
welfare does not imply in itself public sector 
production. Rather it clarifies the need to find out what 
is needed in order to find out the specific requirement 
for which any given type of intervention is the best. 
Financing and delivery thus do not have to be fully 
intertwined and the relationship between them may be 
an area where a change in the welfare state can be 
witnessed. 
  
Is the convergence of welfare states a reason for 
their survival? This section will deal with whether or 
not we are witnessing convergence among mainly EU 
countries focussing on the Nordic model. This is based 
on the assumption that supra-regional convergence can 
take place. Specifically the analysis will also focus on 
social exclusion comparing the Nordic welfare model 
with other welfare models in Europe, using a clustering 
of countries as the methodological device. After a short 
introduction, the section will discuss the concept of 
convergence and will then analyse, by using the 
coefficient of variation as the main indicator, the 
development towards convergence, but also if the 
distinctness of the Nordic model still prevail.  J. Social Sci., 3 (2): 43-51, 2007 
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Table 1: Interventions in the Nordic universal welfare states  
Type of intervention  Possible actions  Consequences 
Direct  Delivery of services  Access following publicly decided criteria – often universal 
Direct/Indirect  Benefits in cash, as vouchers or in other forms  Individuals can decide how to achieve services/goods – extension 
of free-choice an example. Risk of negative welfare consequences 
Indirect  Voluntary support, perhaps financial or obligatory by 
law 
Building social partnerships, incentives for action 
Indirect Moral  appeal  Individual  action  towards other citizens/Companies social 
responsibility 
 
Table 2: The distinction between financing and provision 
Production\Financing Public  Sector  Private Organisations  Private - informal 
Public  Direct delivery through public institutions  Profit/Non-profit based upon 
support to delivery certain services
Families, self-help groups, which 
might be supported 
Private  User charges, vouchers, obligatory insurance  Companies or individual based 
upon certain criteria pays 
Between relatives, friends 
 
Table 3:  Number of times the highest spend more in purchasing power parities per capita in EURO in EU member states than do the lowest, in 
various years since 1980 (EU 15 countries) 
          1980 1990 1993 1995 1996 1999      2003 
Highest/Lowest      5.4  3.7  3.4  3.3  3.3  2.5       2.7 
Source: Calculations based upon Eurostat: Social Protection in EU-member states. Bruxelles, Eurostat, various years. 
 
Table 4: Ranking on the Nordic countries compared to OECD/EU on central parameters 
 Denmark  Finland  Norway  Sweden 
Life Expectancy, 2003  24  15  9  6 
Public Social Expenditure, 2001  2  7  11  1 
Total Tax-Revenue, 2003  2  4  5  1 
National Income pr. capita, 2003  7  16  3  11 
Unemployment, average 1995-2004  9  26  4  17 
Employment rate, 2004  3  14  4  5 
Tertiary Attainment level 25-64, 2003  6  5  8  4 
Spending on active labour market policy, 2004  1  6  8  3 
Spending on passive labour market policy, 2004  1  5  11  9 
Gender pay gap, 2004  19  23  17  19 
Gini-coefficient 3  4  ..  2 
Source: OECD Factbook, 2006 (first 7 rows), Eurostat web database rest 
Note: First 7 rows based upon OECD data ranks 30 countries. Eurostat ranks 24 (EU -25 minus Cyprus, Malta, Poland, Slovenia + Bulgaria, 
Romania and Norway). For Gender pay-gap it is all EU-25 + Bulgaria, Romania and Norway). 
 
  Before approaching this analysis there is a need for 
a few words about what can be understood by 
convergence. Wilensky
[19] was an advocate for that the 
convergence of welfare states could be explained as a 
natural part of the economic development. This 
viewpoint has been criticised from the power-resource 
and politics matter approaches, by for example Castles, 
Stephens and Korpi. Working class or religious parties’ 
strength, agrarian opinion (and its collaboration with 
the working class) etc., rather than just economic 
determinism, contribute to understanding the 
development of welfare states. 
  The convergence discussion has also involved a 
discussion about whether it would be a race to the 
bottom or towards catching-up.  Catching-up has 
mainly been postulated by economic theory and by the 
claim that economic convergence will have a spillover 
effect on social policy
[20]. Spillover can presumably 
also arise due to learning effects and to the spread of 
best practice strategies, indicating at least two sets of 
arguments for moving in a convergent direction.  
  Finally, convergence has also been attached to the 
debate on the crisis of the welfare state
[21], especially in 
relation to the question of whether the public sector 
implies a crowding-out of private initiatives. The 
rhetoric of crisis of the welfare state and its explanation, 
are to a high degree attached to the supposed 
harmonization and convergence, but also to anticipated 
difficulties in the financing and development of welfare 
states. This is a conception built partly on a belief that 
the market is more efficient than the public sector and 
partly on a disbelief in the ability to redistribute income 
and wealth continuously. 
  The same lines of discussion and differences of 
view can be witnessed in the discussion on 
Europeanisation and globalisation today. As argued 
above, one such set of arguments is that open 
economies contribute to convergence through a race to J. Social Sci., 3 (2): 43-51, 2007 
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the bottom in order to cope with wage- and tax-
competition from other countries.  This claim is built to 
a high degree on logical deduction
[22], rather than on 
empirical data. A quite different claim, which will be 
the argument here, is that it is possible to maintain 
different types of welfare states despite the pressures on 
the welfare states.  
  My argument is that although many of the factors 
discussed earlier (financing, demography etc) are at 
play and these factors then could imply a more common 
development of welfare states along converging lines 
depicted as spending on social security as a percentage 
of GDP. But, at the same time institutional differences 
and ways to deliver welfare can be different.  
  A criticism of using the percentage of spending on 
social security in relation to GDP has been that this 
measure does not reflect: Institutional structures, ways 
of financing, fiscal/occupational welfare, the absolute 
level of spending, the degree of redistribution and 
efficiency in delivery and finally the proportion of 
direct service provision versus cash expenditure. Still, 
using data on spending inform us on differences and 
similarities between the welfare states and this is the 
reason also for doing it here. 
  Below will be presented data enabling an analysis 
of whether we are witnessing a convergence among 
welfare states. In this article, convergence is mainly 
expected due too the hypothesis of catching up in 
combination with learning from best practice in other 
countries. 
  It seems that EU member states have been moving 
towards a more uniform level of public sector spending, 
cf. appendix 1. The variation between the EU-member 
states has been declining and this indicates that they are 
moving in the same direction. Thus, we have not seen a 
race to the bottom, as the social dumping argument 
anticipated and this indicates that traditional theories of 
factor equivalence have not proven valid
[22]. A further 
reason therefore is that in a Europe with a diversified 
labour market and economic structures, it is logical to 
have a variety of institutional settings and therefore not 
a race to the bottom either in labour regulations or in 
social security policies is needed. 
  Relative spending might be misleading if taken 
alone. Therefore, Table 3 shows the distance between 
the highest and lowest social spending levels, measured 
in EURO per capita purchasing power parities in 
various years. This distance has been halved since 
1980, when it was more than five times bigger in the 
highest spending country than in the lowest. In 2003, 
the highest spender was Luxembourg (10905) and the 
lowest could be found in Portugal (4076) among those 
15 countries with data since 1980. In 2003, the lowest 
level for all member states was Latvia (1174). 
  Part of this change can be explained by the fact that 
welfare state services are a luxury good and when 
societies become richer, they have been more willing to 
finance a welfare state. Social security has thus not 
been used as the main instrument to gain or increase 
competitiveness by comparison with other countries 
and conversely, European countries in general have not, 
as was feared, been forced to use the low-wage strategy 
and a reduction of the welfare state as part of the 
internationalization of their economies. Alber and 
Standing
[23] conclude that neither convergence nor 
polarization can be witnessed. 
  Tendencies to convergence can also be found in the 
level of total taxation, in the use of indirect taxation and 
in the proportions paid by the various groups 
(employers, employees)
[20]. As might be expected, 
international economic pressures imply that it is more 
difficult to have a high level of public sector deficit and 
over last 30 years there has thus also been a 
convergence in the levels of that
[24]. 
  These factors - income level and taxation - might 
be part of the explanation of why we are also 
witnessing convergence in other areas: as countries, 
economic development seems to be the same, which 
then also makes it possible for them to catch up and 
spend more on social policy. 
  Convergence can be witnessed in other areas than 
just spending, taxation and income differences. Child 
mortality and educational enrolment among the 16-
years-olds has also been converging
[25]. At the same 
time however, other indicators (household 
worklessness, youth unemployment and child poverty) 
are diverging. Tendencies towards convergence can 
also be witnessed in the delivery of health care 
service
[26]. 
  A further convergence of the level of spending
[27] 
can be found if one includes taxation of benefits and 
information about certain elements of occupational 
welfare. Further integrating these aspects, we can also 
see a levelling-out of spending. In 2001, the data are the 
following: Austria (24.1), Belgium (25.7), Denmark 
(25.7), Finland (21.8), France (29.2), Germany (29.2), 
Ireland (13.6), Italy (25.4), Netherlands (20.9), Spain 
(18.6), Sweden (28.3) and UK (23.6)
[28].  
  Therefore, it might be that on the level of rhetoric, 
things look alike at the surface, but when it comes to 
detailed analysis a more varied and broad picture 
emerges. Part of this debate concerns whether or not 
convergent trends can be witnessed and will continue. 
In addition, as this section has indicated, convergence 
under several indicators might well go hand in hand 
with continued differences in some areas and in  J. Social Sci., 3 (2): 43-51, 2007 
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Annex 1: Current expenditure on social protection in % of GDP for EU 15  countries 
    1980 1990 1995  1998  2001  2003  Change  1990-2003 
Austria   26,7 29,7  28,4  28,4  29,5 2,8 
Belgium  28 26,8 29,7  27,5  27,5  29,7 2,9 
Denmark  28,7 30,3 34,3  30  29,5  30,9 0,6 
Germany  28,8 25,4 29,4  29,3  29,8  30,2 4,8 
Greece  9,7 22,6 20,7  24,5 27,1 26,3  3,7 
Spain  18,2 20,4 21,9  21,6  20,1  19,7  -0,7 
France  25,4 27,7 30,6  30,5  30  30,9 3,2 
Ireland  20,6 19,1 19,9  16,1  15,3  16,5  -2,6 
Italy  19,4 24,1 24,6  25,2  25,6  26,4 2,3 
Luxembourg  26,5 23,5 25,3  24,1  21,2  23,8 0,3 
Netherlands  30,1 32,5 31,6  28,5  27,6  28,1  -4,4 
Portugal  12,9 15,5 20,7  23,4  23,9  24,3 8,8 
Finland   25,5 32,8  27,2  25,8  26,9 1,4 
Sweden   32,9 35,6  33,3  31,3  33,5 0,6 
United  Kingdom  21,5  23,1  28 26,8 27,2 26,7  3,6 
EU-12/15  24,3 25,4 28,4  28,4  27,5  28,3 2,9 
Standarddeviation  6,60 4,77 5,17  4,18  4,32  4,47   
Arithemetic  average  22,48 25,07 27,65  26,43  26,02  26,89   
Coefficient of variation  0,29   0,19   0,19   0,16   0,17   0,17    
Source. Eurostat various years statistics in focus and also available www.ep.eurostat.ec.europa.eu 
 
Annex 2: Clustering countries with regard to central variables for social exclusion and social protection in 2003 
  1 2 3 4 5 6  7  8 
EU-25  28 16 12,3  18 30 0,9 2,3  9,6 
Nordic  30,4 10,7 11,2 16,0 24,0 1,3  0,5  5,9 
Central  28,7 13,5 11,8 13,7 26,8 0,9  1,5  8,3 
Eastern  Europe  21,7 15,8 9,4  10,0 27,6 0,7  3,6  9,7 
Baltic 13,5  16,3  6,4  14,3 33,0 0,3  3,0  7,0 
Southern  Europe  21,7 18,0 10,7 29,2 32,0 0,6  1,5  7,6 
Atlantic  21,6 19,5 7,7  32,0 33,0 1,3  0,5  14,3
1. Social Protection public spending as percentages of GDP in 2003   
2. At risk of poverty 2003               
3. Pension expenditures as percentage of GDP in 2003   
4. At risk of poverty people above 65           
5.  Gini-coefficient            
6. Expenditure on social exclusion in 2003 as percentages of GDP   
7. Very-long term unemployment-rate in 2004 as percentage of the labour force, e.g. after more than 24 months of unemployment      
8. Children living in jobless housholds.2005         
Source: European Commission, 2006 and own calculations based hereupon 
Note:            
Nordic  Denmark, Finland and Sweden       
Central  Germany, Austria, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg 
Eastern Europe  Czech, Poland, Hungary, Slovak, Slovenia   
Baltic  Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania         
Southern Europe  Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Cyprus, Malta   
Atlantic  Eire, United Kingdom         
 
institutional structures and specific programmes. 
  Looking at the development using cluster analysis 
in Appendix 2, some central data on social exclusion 
and social protection are provided for six clusters. The 
next section will be looking upon individual Nordic 
countries positions. These clusters have mainly been 
chosen geographically, but they also reflect traditional 
welfare-state analysis
[13]. Eastern Europe is treated as a 
single bloc due to its recent transition, with the Baltic 
States being seen as one group, as they have the lowest 
levels of spending on social protection.  
  The appendix shows that in general the Nordic 
model perform well compared to the other clusters in 
Europe with risk of poverty for those above the age of 
65 at the main exception. However, one thing being the 
cluster another how individual countries carry out 
compared to other countries, this can be seen in Section 
5. 
 
The Nordic welfare states compared: As mentioned 
earlier core characteristics of the Nordic welfare states 
has been their ambition to maintain full employment, a 
high degree of public welfare and a commitment to 
equality in a mainly universal delivery of goods and J. Social Sci., 3 (2): 43-51, 2007 
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services. In order to analyse whether this is still the case 
in Table 4 the Nordic countries are compared to 
OECD/EU countries on central parameters. 
  In Table 4, the Nordic countries are ranked on 11 
parameters in order to analyse when comparing with the 
rest of the OECD or EU area the Nordic countries can 
still be depicted as having a specific place in the 
categories of welfare states. 
  The data in Table 4 shows a blurred picture with 
regard to whether the Nordic countries still are fulfilling 
the criteria. A criterion could be that the Nordic 
countries all are in the best 1/3 of the countries (10 for 
OECD and 8-9 for EU). Using this as a structuring 
device the Nordic countries position can be split into 
fulfilling/not fulfilling and some ambiguous: 
  Fulfilling: tax-revenue, tertiary attainment level, 
spending on active labour market policy, Gini-
coefficient 
Not fulfilling: life-expectancy, national income pr. 
capita, unemployment, gender-pay gab 
Ambiguous: public social expenditure and spending on 
passive labour market policy (only Norway is just 
outside as number 11), employment rate (only Norway 
outside as number 14 and the other three countries 
placed 3, 4 and 5). 
  More simple put fulfilling in four areas, not 
fulfilling in other four areas and within the borderlines 
for the EU countries in three areas with Norway outside 
the ranking. 
  Therefore, in a sense the Nordic welfare states are 
still with a high commitment to have a high 
employment rate, high labour force participation and an 
active labour market policy. It is still also countries 
with a high degree of equality, public sector spending 
and tax-level. 
  At the same time, unemployment is high in Sweden 
and Finland although declining in recent years. It is 
countries with lower life-expectancy than most other 
OECD countries (especially Denmark) and countries 
with a higher gender-pay gap than in other countries. 
The higher gender pay gap can at least partly be 
explained by a higher female participation rate and this 
especially in the public sectors welfare areas where 
income is lower than in the private sector.  
  The full picture is thus blurred when it comes to 
distinguishing the Nordic welfare states from others. 
Service provision has also been argued to be a 
cornerstone of the Nordic welfare states, but with the 
increasing focus on how to combine work and family 
life, as also becoming part of the European 
Employment Strategy, day care for children has been 
on the agenda in many European countries and in this 
way, the difference might be withering away. 
CONCLUSION 
 
  Nordic Welfare States and the Nordic model are 
here to stay, as the data shows still distinctive elements 
are clear in the Nordic countries. A core reason is, as 
discussed in the article, the broad meaning and 
interpretation of what a welfare state is. This implies 
that even if many changes take place, and delivery and 
financing change dramatically in many countries, we 
would still need a welfare state in order to cope with 
failure of the market. Furthermore, all welfare states 
will need to balance the benefits and costs of every 
activity and it might be that global development will 
make it more difficult in some areas than in others to 
maintain the historical basis of the welfare state. 
  The Nordic welfare states do well when it comes to 
ensure a high degree of equality and with regard to 
access to the labour market and public delivery and 
financing of welfare state activities. Nevertheless, on 
other areas such as life-expectancy and national income 
pr. capita they do less well. This reflects also that 
typologies are mainly a structuring device, which does 
not necessarily will be followed in each detail in all 
countries. 
  I agree further with Barr on globalization and the 
welfare state when he observes, “the implications for 
the welfare state are not necessarily apocalyptic”
[15]. He 
offers four arguments why this is the case - the main 
reason being adaptations by the welfare states, both in 
the already industrialised countries and in the newly 
industrialised countries.  
  Perhaps more important is the argument that a 
change in public consumption does not necessarily 
change the overall spending level, which could be taken 
over by employers (e.g. occupational welfare in 
Titmuss’s understanding) and this could be combined 
with tax-deductions (fiscal welfare). In this sense, the 
central emphasis on state delivery can be reduced, but, 
as indicated by the figures and discussion in the article, 
this does not imply that other ways of delivery and 
financing cannot take the state’s place. 
  We will thus be witnessing adaptation and changed 
boundaries between state and market. However, at the 
same time citizens in the richer welfare states will 
continue to expect and demand (due to rising income) 
the delivery of services to cope with needs for care, 
income-smoothing over the lifetime and our constant 
requirements for new kinds of consumption. It might be 
that it is not economic reasons, which bring the service-
welfare state to an end, but more the difficulty of 
finding the labour willing and prepared to do the job. 
  The pathways witnessed seems to imply that we 
see and presumably will continue to see convergence in J. Social Sci., 3 (2): 43-51, 2007 
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the overall level of spending, economic prosperity, the 
demographic situation and labour market affiliation; but 
at the same this leaves every country with room for 
national decisions reflecting differences in taste, culture 
and history. 
  The Nordic countries are thus neither witnessing a 
race to the bottom, nor a fully-fledged, convergent, 
integrated development towards a common welfare-
state type. At the same time it is the case, as Atkinson 
has put it, that rolling back the welfare state would “hit 
hard some of the most disadvantaged members of our 
societies”
[29]. This might be another reason for that we 
seem to be witnessing: a continuation of welfare state 
development. 
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